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THE OTHER LOW-CARBON  
PROTAGONISTS
Poor People’s Movements and Climate  
Politics in São Paulo
Daniel Aldana Cohen
This chapter is based on dissertation research and a journal article under review and duplicates 
some of the arguments and data found there. My thanks to this volume’s editors and anonymous 
reviewers for comments and assistance in refining the argument. I thank Craig Calhoun, Gianpaolo 
Baiochhi, Neil Brenner, Eric Klinenberg, Jeff Manza, Steven Lukes, Timmons Roberts, Vivek Chib-
ber, Jeff Goodwin, Colin Jerolmack, Matthew Connelly, and James Fleming, as well as the members 
of NYU’s Economic and Political Sociology Workshop for feedback on earlier versions of this work. 
I also thank Eduardo Marques and the Centro de Estudos da Metropóle in São Paulo for hosting 
me during part of my fieldwork, and Mariana Fix, Ruy Braga, João Seitte Whitaker, Angela Alonso, 
and Daniel Sanfelici for their intellectual generosity and insights while I conducted fieldwork in São 
Paulo. And thanks to my informants and interviewees, who were extraordinarily generous with their 
time and attention. My fieldwork in São Paulo was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada.
In the São Paulo of the late 2000s, two civil society projects rose to prominence. 
Each aimed to make a brutal city more humane and livable for its residents, start-
ing with the downtown core. But each group framed its efforts in different ways 
and pursued its goals using different methods. While the city’s housing movement 
occupied vacant buildings to pressure state actors to build up affordable hous-
ing and democratize urban planning, green policy elites worked closely with city 
managers on a downtown revitalization plan that would model a more intelli-
gently dense, and hence lower-carbon, style of urbanism. Groups that might have 
cooperated in building a more democratic and more energy-efficient city ended 
up on opposite sides of a great battle over how the city would be transformed. 
Years later, these two camps tentatively explored working together. How did this 
estrangement take hold? And why is there now a tentative basis for cooperation?
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There is more to this case than a one-off puzzle of working-class and 
professional-class ships passing in the night. For São Paulo’s developments speak 
to a broader puzzle in accounts of urban ecological politics: Why is the imple-
mentation of urgently needed, apparently broadly beneficial, low-carbon poli-
cies, passed by city governments, stagnating in the real world (Bulkeley 2011)? 
The stakes are high. As the planet warms, and as the pressure on all levels of gov-
ernment to slash heat-trapping greenhouse gas emissions grows, urban politics 
will increasingly be structured by the logics of climate politics. The question is 
less whether urban regions manage to shrink their carbon footprints at all; rather, 
what is up for grabs is how fast they slash emissions, and who wins and who loses 
from the policies that are ultimately implemented. Whose consumption will be 
curbed to keep a lid on emissions?
There can be no success in “right to the city” struggles that is not, simultane-
ously, a success in democratically decarbonizing urban life. Once we realize that 
several core stakes of right-to-the-city struggles—especially housing, transit, and 
land use—are the also the core stakes of low-carbon urbanism, we see that it is 
no longer possible (or desirable) to deeply distinguish social from environmental 
politics (Cohen 2015).
São Paulo is a good place to work through our f ledgling future, because in 
many ways, its dynamics reflect worldwide trends among large, relatively pros-
perous cities of the North and South. As has happened elsewhere with big cities 
undergoing deindustrialization and in the broader neoliberal context, São Pau-
lo’s housing and labor markets have polarized, with local inequality increasing 
even as countrywide it has gone down. Housing insecurity there has increased 
massively since the late 1970s, when 1 percent of the population lived in informal, 
illegal settlements; today, the rate hovers around 30 percent. The explosion in 
these numbers greatly outpaces the far more modest rate of migration to the city 
over the course of those decades. It is the result, instead, of rising rents and build-
ing abandonment downtown, and the degradation of the labor market across the 
city (UN-HABITAT 2010). And as congestion has increased, São Paulo’s poor 
have been pushed farther and farther from the job-rich downtown, forced to 
endure increasingly long and painful commutes by bus. Investments in the built 
environment, including transit, overwhelmingly favored private automobiles, 
even as the great majority of commuters continued to travel by public transit 
(Rolnik and Klintowitz 2011). It is no accident that in June 2013, when massive 
protests demanding higher-quality and more affordable transportation broke 
out across Brazil, the greatest numbers mobilized in São Paulo.
Meanwhile, again reflecting a global trend, affluent professionals are moving 
into São Paulo’s downtown core, lured by developers working with city govern-
ments. This has coincided with professional-class-rooted civil society groups 
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joining campaigns to improve the quality of central areas’ urban amenities; 
these campaigns have increasingly taken on ecological themes, from the local 
environment to global climate change. Green policy elites have argued that cit-
ies should be increasing density, reducing car use, and building larger and more 
energy-efficient buildings, thus shrinking carbon footprints and slowing global 
warming while boosting their economic vitality and the quality of life of their 
citizens. In the late 2000s, São Paulo was one of the first global cities whose 
municipal government, working with environmental groups, passed an ambi-
tious low-carbon policy. Countless other cities have since followed.
Housing-oriented, working-class movements, flying the banner of the right 
to the city, have also been active in contesting the shape of the city’s center, again 
reflecting global trends. Fighting back against growing inequalities in labor and 
housing markets, they have demanded higher-quality public services, more pub-
lic transit, and especially more centrally located affordable housing—in sum, 
another version of a smart densification agenda. This agenda would also slash 
carbon emissions, although for the most part housing-oriented movements have 
not embraced environmentalist rhetoric.
This issue of whether, and how, to understand working-class urban projects as 
ecologically beneficial is central. So before introducing the São Paulo case, I pro-
pose an encompassing reconceptualization of urban ecological politics.
Ecologies Green and Gray, Luxury and Democratic
In the 2000s, some of the world’s biggest, richest cities decided to cut their carbon 
emissions. Ken Livingstone, elected London’s mayor in 2000, founded a global 
network and then merged it with Present Bill Clinton’s urban climate initiative to 
create the C40 Large Cities Leadership Network. New York, Toronto, São Paulo, 
and others would soon seize leading roles in the C40. In each case, cities took up 
the argument that intelligent densification involving housing, transit, and land 
use could at once reduce emissions, increase economic dynamism, and improve 
residents’ quality of life (Greenberg 2015; Seto 2014).
How were this agenda’s social and ecological dimensions connected? Let us 
first label the density-based, emissions-cutting interventions gray ecologies. These 
“gray” interventions, based in infrastructure and the built environment, yield 
ecological benefits without looking like typical “green” environmentalist inter-
ventions, like ponds, parks, or tree-lined streets. Gray ecologies are good for the 
environment because they produce little pollution, which is why environmental-
ists increasingly advocate compact city urbanism.
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We distinguish these gray ecologies from more familiar features of urban 
greening, or green ecologies. While the principal virtue of the former lies in reduc-
ing (often indirectly) our pollution and resource use, green ecologies’ principal 
ecological contribution is improving the quality of our air, water, and sense of 
well-being. I place the two ecologies on a continuum, since in practice projects 
and developments often contain elements of each.
From a social perspective we can understand each kind of ecology in terms 
of what the urbanist Manuel Castells has termed collective consumption—the 
state-mediated provision of public services, like housing, transit, and parks (Cas-
tells 1977, 1983, 2002; Kowarick 2000). The term once implied universalist ser-
vices aimed at the broad majority of the population. But in the contemporary, 
neoliberal period, state intervention has been inverted. Direct grants, subsidies, 
and public services, as well as tax breaks and other incentives, are now commonly 
targeted toward business and elites, and the first priority is improving the every-
day life of the professional class.
This mode of governance and urban economic development has led to the rise 
of what I term luxury ecologies, denoting projects and developments aimed prin-
cipally at benefiting the professional class and associated businesses, especially 
finance, real estate, and the firms that assist and surround these (the so-called 
“creative” sectors). The term “luxury” refers both to the beneficiaries of indi-
vidual groups and projects, and to the broader luxury city model notoriously 
pioneered by New York’s mayor Michael Bloomberg (Brash 2011). Luxury ecolo-
gies have fit the framework of urban neoliberalism; looking ahead, as pressures 
to slash emissions increase, we should expect increasing convergence between 
neoliberal urbanism and luxury ecologies.
In contrast, we can term ecologically inflected projects and developments 
targeting a city’s broad majorities democratic ecologies, in reference both to 
their universalistic orientation and the short-term imperative of helping those 
in greatest need. Democratic ecologies recall a more social democratic form of 
urbanism; looking ahead, they are likely to converge more and more explicitly 
with the right-to-the-city agenda. (For examples, see figure 7.1.)
According to this framework, urban politics in general, including struggles for 
the right to the city, are increasingly (and increasingly explicitly) dominated by 
the tension between luxury and democratic ecologies. This requires that analysts 
look beneath the surface of who is normally labeled as an urban environmental 
(and climate) actor.
Looking beyond everyday labels is crucial. Few residents of São Paulo (or other 
cities) complain in everyday life about the atmosphere’s concentration of carbon 
dioxide. For ordinary residents, competing visions and politics of housing and 
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transit are more likely to be front-of-mind. And yet, since everyone’s actions have 
ecological consequences, we should understand everyone as an ecological actor, just 
as we treat everyone as an economic actor. São Paulo’s (and indeed every city’s) 
climate politics coincide with, at minimum, the giant questions of who will be 
housed, when, where, and how; the priorities and quantities of investment into 
public transit; how flood and rainwater defense will be organized; which broader 
economic development strategies will aggregate all the individual pieces of 
socio-ecological policy; and so on. Green policy elites and scholars often under-
state the social implications of this situation (Wachsmuth, Cohen, and Angelo 
2016). But major social conflict is inevitable around green and gray ecologies 
because their realization implicates the core interests of all urban residents. The 
social realm of climate policy making may be small. Its social ramifications, how-
ever, are huge.
Among these is how we understand prospective political alliances. Both my 
analytic framework and empirical findings suggest that there is a possible alliance 
between segments of the professional class and the broad working class around 
intelligent, low-carbon, affordable and accessible densification—in short, demo-
cratic gray ecologies. I am arguing that the climate crisis, and the fact that efficient 
low-carbon urbanism tends toward egalitarianism (or its undesirable opposite, a 
vicious eco-apartheid), could ultimately drive some green policy elites and some 
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FIGURE 7.1. Heuristic grid, with examples. In practice, the placement of any 
particular project or development will depend on local context.
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of their professional-class constituency to support a right-to-the-city agenda if it 
is (as I argue) the best bet to slash carbon emissions. In terms of the analogy of 
the city as a factory, this recalls something like the tense, uneasy, but productive 
class alliances involved in the New Deal, and especially during the subsequent 
war economy.
Putting such emphasis on carbon probably seems far-fetched. But in my view, 
progressive scholars and thinkers have, for the most part, simply not reckoned 
with how quickly and intensely the climate crisis will dominate our politics, along 
with the dangers and opportunities that this fact represents (see Klein 2014; 
Cohen 2015). Since prosperous areas will need to cut emissions by 100 percent 
by the mid-2030s to prevent catastrophe (Anderson 2015), struggling with those 
goals is bound to dominate politics. Looking ahead, it is not in abstract historical 
time that the broad right-to-the-city movement will develop, but in the crisis time 
of growing pressures to slash carbon emissions and in the context of increasing 
extreme weather events (Cohen 2016; Gotham and Greenberg 2014). We must 
study the present in terms of how it is changing in the face of new pressures.
My account of the São Paulo case is based on primary and secondary data 
gathered during thirteen months of fieldwork, undertaken in several waves 
between June 2010 and May 2015. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 
fifty-five key government actors, green policy elites, and poor people’s move-
ments’ leaders—largely housing-focused.1 I spent dozens of hours observing 
public political meetings and events. And I have collected evidence from second-
ary sources, including newspapers and magazines; academic articles, reports, and 
graduate theses; policy documents provided by interviewees or accessed in public 
(and online) archives; and records of political meetings. In what follows, I intro-
duce the São Paulo case, outline its leading players, and explain its low-carbon 
policy stagnation by tracing the estrangement of poor people’s movements and 
green policy elites. I then show how a recently elected center-left government has 
brought elements of these groups back into dialogue.
Climate Politics in São Paulo
An Exemplary Case
Metro São Paulo has twenty million inhabitants; municipal São Paulo, eleven 
million. Every global city is unique. Still, in a warming world characterized 
by planetary urbanization (Brenner 2014), São Paulo resembles other big cit-
ies in several ways. It suffers from cities’ typical vulnerability to extreme 
weather. Already-severe seasonal flooding—from swelling rivers and rainwater 
runoff—will worsen with global warming, further paralyzing traffic, cutting off 
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electricity, and sometimes killing residents (Nobre 2010). Drought and water 
shortages have also lately plagued the region (Cohen 2016).
Also like cities worldwide, São Paulo suffers from paralyzing congestion—only 
worse. A recent study found that average commutes were longer in metro São 
Paulo than in nineteen of twenty comparable cities worldwide (Pereira and 
Schwanen 2013). Vehicles cause most of São Paulo’s greenhouse gas emissions 
(Prefeitura do Município de São Paulo 2005). Other effects of cars’ pollution are 
less abstract. An autopsy technician has said that pollution is now so bad, he can 
no longer tell from the lungs of the corpses on his table whether or not they were 
smokers (Burgierman 2011).
Congestion results from the concentration of employment in central areas, 
while workers have been pushed into the metro region’s sprawling peripher-
ies of low-slung homes they often had to build themselves. There is also the 
middle-class romance with the automobile; municipal São Paulo’s eleven mil-
lion residents today own seven million cars, which clog city streets, while most 
residents ride the underfunded public transit system, mostly in overcrowded 
buses. City government is under pressure from all sides to improve central areas’ 
socio-ecological qualities. Yet there are starkly different programs for how to 
carry out this agenda, paired with competing visions of whose needs it should 
prioritize.
A Climate Law Enters the Picture
One such agenda, developed by the 2005–2012 center-right mayoral regime, was 
to combine ecological policy making with a finance- and real-estate-oriented 
growth policy anchored in downtown redevelopment. São Paulo’s center-right 
mayor Gilberto Kassab strongly supported a climate law to this effect, which the 
city council passed with a unanimous vote in September 2009.
The climate law’s headline target was an ambitious 30 percent reduction 
of the city’s greenhouse gas emissions (against a 2003 baseline) by 2012—that 
is, in just three years. This expectation was not realistic. But it was reasonable 
to expect that at least the city’s highest-profile, climate-linked projects would 
get off the ground, building political momentum for greater emissions reduc-
tions down the road. Of central interest here were the measures proposed to 
reorganize city life to reduce vehicle emissions. Strategies included policies to 
increase the quantity and the energy efficiency of public transit and to impose 
the concept of “compact city” planning on subsequent developments and 
redevelopments.
The compact-city provision was no mere rhetorical flourish. In São Paulo, 
climate policy networks, including many with São Paulo offices, pressed this 
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objective repeatedly to a receptive audience. It was at the 2007 C40 summit in 
New York City, where the conjoined virtues of density and carbon reductions 
were trumpeted by New York mayor Bloomberg, that São Paulo’s mayor Kassab 
decided that his city needed a climate law and demanded that his secretary of the 
environment, Eduardo Jorge, design one. The “compact city” clause harmonized 
with the administration’s already strong emphasis on densifying and revitalizing 
much of the city’s urban core.
The devil would lie in the social detail of the climate law’s implementation, 
especially transit policy and downtown redevelopment. Success would depend 
on how climate-policy-linked projects related to housing movements, which 
were battling to implement their own vision for a more compact and efficient 
central São Paulo. Before I zoom in on these climate-linked battles, I pause to 
examine their protagonists.
A Tale of Two Compact-City Political Infrastructures
Two political infrastructures of civil society stand out for their pursuit of a 
somewhat similar vision: more downtown housing, more public transit, greater 
economic development, and enhanced services distributed in the peripheries.2 
Leading actors from each group pursued this agenda through the 2000s. But they 
never cooperated, nor saw each other as allies.
One political infrastructure is the green policy elites. They understand them-
selves as environmentalists, often prioritizing greenhouse gas emissions reduc-
tions. They largely come from São Paulo’s professional (or in local terms, “middle”) 
class, attend a handful of elite universities, live in well-heeled neighborhoods, 
have traveled to North America and Europe, and work in networks with global 
(especially environmentalist) civil society. In the early 2000s (2000–2004) a small 
network of green policy elites worked with the leftist Workers’ Party’s (PT) may-
oral regime. But when a center-right regime was elected and took power in 2005, 
environmentalists began to cooperate with the new administration, looking for 
ways to realign social and environmental priorities. Ultimately, environmental 
politics in the city came of age just as a new phase of city government-led neolib-
eral urban governance was taking shape.
A second civil society political infrastructure has been composed of poor 
people’s movements, especially their most dynamic sector, housing movements. 
In a city with a housing deficit estimated at one million units, the movements 
have consistently advocated for more construction of affordable housing near 
jobs and services, especially the downtown core (Fundação Gaspar Garcia 2012). 
This demand was nested in a national campaign for “urban reform” and the right 
to the city.
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The movement’s leadership grew out of the broad ranks of its members—poor 
and working class, often lacking a home, often based in the periphery, often having 
migrated from the northeast, and darker-skinned than São Paulo’s light-skinned 
elite. Lead organizers have tended to work closely with academics, acquire gradu-
ate degrees, and travel internationally in leftist circuits, from regular occurrences 
like the World Social Forum to idiosyncratic exchanges, like ones organized from 
New York by the Pratt Institute and the Rosa Luxemburg Siftung.
The housing movement support hub Apoio exemplifies this. Apoio is con-
nected to the city’s most confrontational movements, but also works with foreign 
funders—especially the British Catholic charity CAFOD—on programming to 
raise awareness around housing and other social rights among working-class 
city residents, especially women. Overall, housing movements in São Paulo have 
sought to pressure and influence PT politicians, while supporting the party at 
election time. They differ from polite civil society most significantly in their 
confrontational tactic of occupying buildings to press their demands for more 
affordable housing. They frame occupations in terms of existing legislation and 
constitutional norms, including property’s obligation to fill a social function 
(often understood as a right to the city) laid out in the 1988 constitution; speci-
fication of this principle in the federal “Statute of the City” was passed under 
movement pressure in 2001. São Paulo’s housing movements cite the law, which 
in practice is rarely followed. Instead, there is regular police repression of housing 
movement activities (Fórum Centro Vivo 2006). Their organizing has required 
painful, grinding work. Two leading movements’ slogans are “Occupy, Resist, 
Build” and “Those Who Don’t Struggle, Die.”
The anthropologist Teresa Caldeira (2000) has described São Paulo as a “city 
of walls,” with different social classes inhabiting divided spaces under the specter 
of violent crime, including rampant police violence. But intense class divisions, 
all on their own, cannot explain the estrangement of green policy elites and poor 
people’s housing movements. In São Paulo, many middle-class professionals have 
for decades been members and allies of radical left political projects led by the 
poor. The housing movements’ allies include well-known academics and young 
students from wealthy families. Like green policy elites, poor people’s move-
ments have had extensive contacts within city government. If green policy elites 
chose not to work with housing movements at that time, this reflected not brute 
class interest, but a political decision based on a context where the center-right 
was wielding power. Yes, for some greens this was a more familiar political cul-
ture; but not for all, and not absolutely. Through the intermediary of the PT, 
green policy elites have also joined projects and developments—green and gray 
ecologies—that prioritized the collective consumption needs of the poor when 
the PT was in power, to a small extent from 2000 to 2004, and more extensively 
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since 2013. Below, we explore the shifting contexts of the movements’ estrange-
ment and rapprochement.
Carbon, Class, and the City Core
In the early 2000s, it was the center-left Workers’ Party (PT) mayoral regime of 
Marta Suplicy that laid the foundation for São Paulo’s 2009 climate law. And yet, 
almost no one to whom I spoke recalled this history. I sketch it here because it 
reminds us of how fluid the link between social and climate politics can be, both 
in substance and in political labeling.
Transit—from Democratic to Luxury Ecologies
Suplicy’s administration pursued several policies manifesting the “socio- 
ecological” orientation then circulating on the Brazilian left (see Hochstetler 
and Keck 2007). The administration passed clean air policies that persuaded the 
United Nations’ urban sustainability policy network, the ICLEI (International 
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives), to relocate its Latin American 
office from Buenos Aires to São Paulo. Secretary of the Environment Adriano 
Diogo then arranged for a detailed audit of the city’s greenhouse gas emissions. 
The audit was completed in 2005, soon providing the informational baseline 
for the Kassab regime’s low-carbon policy making. Diogo also moved to build 
the city’s first biogas plant to slash methane emissions. Both Suplicy and Diogo 
contributed to ICLEI’s Portuguese-language climate policy newsletter, Con-
exão Clima. And the administration passed a pro-density master plan that used 
“socio-environmental” principles to guide its pro-density policies.
Yet Suplicy’s administration never trumpeted, as such, her most effective 
low-carbon policy: a massive expansion and rationalization of bus service. In 
2002, the administration introduced an electronic fare card to facilitate free 
transfers between buses, and discounted transfers to the subway system—a com-
plex feat because buses were operated by private companies and the subway by 
the state level of government. The administration also poured cash and politi-
cal capital into the construction of nearly one hundred kilometers of dedicated 
bus lanes, dramatically improving the mobility of the city’s poor in the face of 
middle-class opposition to the resulting construction work in (and increased 
accessibility to) their neighborhoods.
In 2004 Suplicy was defeated in her reelection bid by center-right candidate 
José Serra, who was succeeded by his deputy Gilberto Kassab in 2006. Each of 
these center-right mayors worked closely with Secretary of the Environment 
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Eduardo Jorge, who persuaded them to place ecological politics at the heart of 
their economic development agenda. Perhaps the most striking departure was 
the abandonment of bus service expansion as a priority, despite cars’ leading 
role in greenhouse gas emissions, and in other pollutants that damaged public 
health. Jorge, as environment secretary, lacked the direct jurisdiction over bus 
policy needed to push bus lanes through. But he could have used his prestige to 
advocate bus lane policy explicitly. He never did, despite making frequent broad 
critiques of the city’s car culture. Jorge did, however, support aggressive action 
to expand bicycle lanes—leading to the construction of two hundred kilometers 
of lanes in eight years, of which a plurality were categorized as “recreational.” In 
that period, the city constructed only twelve kilometers of dedicated bus lanes. 
In short, the transit policies of the Kassab regime represented a shift from demo-
cratic to luxury ecologies, and bus service stagnated as a result.
Indeed, when street protests erupted all across Brazil in June 2013 to protest 
fare hikes, the greatest numbers mobilized in São Paulo (Maricato 2013). At the 
protests’ peak in late June, crowds numbered in the hundreds of thousands and 
combined middle- and working-class, white and black city residents. This mass 
outpouring of rage constituted a kind of accidental low-carbon urbanism, a cry 
for more democratic gray ecologies, as Naomi Klein (2014) has suggested.
But in contrast to housing organizing, this outburst was almost entirely spon-
taneous. An organizer of the Free Fare Movement that organized the protests 
told me that in the months leading up to the protests, about forty activists would 
attend weekly meetings. In recent years in São Paulo, transit activism has not 
manifested the kind of lasting social movement infrastructure at the core of the 
housing movement. If the June Days, as they are known, constituted a pivotal and 
transformative event in demonstrating the capacity for multi-class outrage over 
collective consumption, they did not herald a major new organizing force in the 
city. If anything, it was the traditional housing movements that ultimately grew 
the most in the long aftermath of those protests (Cohen 2016).
Nova Luz and the Housing Question—Luxury  
Ecology from Above
By the 2000s, downtown São Paulo seemed to be emerging from a long decline, 
its streets the sites of a chaotic mix of leading business and governmental func-
tions, services and commerce (much of it informal), elite cultural institutions, 
and a great deal of poverty and abandonment. In the early 2000s, it was estimated 
that 17 percent of the housing units downtown were abandoned (Bomfim 2004, 
66). Poor families organized by housing movements would break in and squat, 
announcing their presence by draping movement flags out windows.
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But the movements were not alone in seeking to improve the center’s 
socio-ecological qualities. In keeping with global trends, the São Paulo real estate 
sector encouraged young professionals’ changing taste in lifestyle by focus-
ing attention on the historical center’s still-vital services and infrastructures, 
degraded building stock, and fledgling cultural capital. The goal was to transform 
São Paulo into a “global city” like New York, London, or Paris (Fix 2007). This 
vision, embraced by the center-right Serra and Kassab regimes, would combine 
economic development with an increasingly prominent ecological program.
The immediate target was an area near a train station called Luz, where the 
city had encouraged the construction of new museums and a concert hall. The 
administration used middle-class fears of crime and degradation, crystallized in 
the popular image of a tangle of streets known as crackolandia, or crack-land, 
to justify a redevelopment project called Nova Luz (new light). The idea was to 
implant in a small area a European-style downtown, but dominated by a postin-
dustrial “creative” sector of large tech companies, advertising and marketing 
firms, and a large cultural nonprofit. Some historic buildings would be restored, 
others demolished and replaced. The plan’s ecological dimensions kept grow-
ing. After all, Kassab had asked Jorge to draft a low-carbon plan after they had 
visited New York in 2007, where Bloomberg had celebrated the confluence of 
central city revitalizations (as he understood them) and low-carbon, gray ecolo-
gies achieved via density. And within Jorge’s green secretariat, there was a great 
deal of interest in leveraging densification to shrink the city’s carbon footprint.
But getting Nova Luz built would cost a lot of money and displace residents 
and businesses that preferred to stay. The city government, stymied by opposition, 
decided to outsource the right to expropriate properties in the area to private com-
panies. This subcontracting of a traditionally public function galvanized opposi-
tion. Housing movements and an association of small shopkeepers worked together 
to block the redevelopment. The groups distrusted government promises of new 
affordable housing, promises that in similar projects elsewhere had been broken.
Neither the city’s economic development planners nor environmentalists were 
able to assuage these concerns. Remarkably, even historically progressive urban 
policy makers in the environmental secretariat, like the green secretary Jorge, 
refused to recognize the legitimacy of social movement opposition to the plan. 
In Jorge’s comments recorded at public meetings, he celebrated Nova Luz’s eco-
logical potential, lamented the existing poverty, argued that displacing current 
residents into far-flung favelas would be “illogical, inefficient, and inhuman,” and 
made no mention of organized movements of the poor (“Ata Da 25a Reunião 
Plenária Extraordinaria” 2011).
Yet one might argue these green advocates were the ones lacking vision. While 
David Harvey has argued that the right to the city includes both a “right of access 
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to what already exists” and “a right to change [the city] after our heart’s desire” 
(Weinstein and Ren 2009), green policy elites in São Paulo seemed willing, at 
most, to engage with the right to access of the generic poor. Working-class social 
movements’ right to change the city, with all the political organization and the 
distinctive normative registers that this entailed, was never taken seriously.
Indeed, São Paulo’s housing movements had been articulating an alternative 
project for the downtown, developed in parallel to Nova Luz. We will see that it 
was not just an abstract desire for justice that green policy elites ignored, but a 
concrete, compelling, and well-known project for a more egalitarian and demo-
cratic São Paulo, a project equally consistent with low-carbon objectives.
Demanding a Democratic Center
On March 8, 1997, one of São Paulo’s housing groups conducted the city’s first 
large-scale occupation of a downtown building; this set off waves of occupations 
throughout the 2000s (Earle 2012). As federal and municipal law in the early 2000s 
mandated that city government guarantee property’s “social function” by increasing 
taxes on abandoned buildings, and then seizing them for social housing, the occupa-
tions framed themselves as bottom-up accelerators of established legal norms.
At the turn of the century, a multi-class coalition organized in connection with 
the downtown housing movements, called the Forum for a Living Center, would 
bring this broader perspective to public attention in São Paulo. In 2000, the forum 
released a twelve-point platform for the “democratization of the city center,” 
including calls for the defense of property’s social function, against its capture by 
real estate speculation, and for popular, participatory housing policies for central 
areas (Fórum Centro Vivo 2006, 1–2). Four years later, their coalition released a 
manifesto “for a living center” to articulate an alternative to the “so-called ‘revital-
ization of the center’ that is in fashion” (Fórum Centro Vivo 2004).
In one especially high-profile occupation, there was an attempt to prefig-
ure housing movements’ vision of their own success. Just two blocks from the 
planned Nova Luz’s edge, a twenty-three-story building on Avenida Prestes Maia 
was occupied by hundreds of families, many organized through a close affili-
ate of Apoio. This was South America’s largest squat. Allied intellectuals helped 
build sophisticated cultural spaces inside, including a library of thousands of 
volumes. The occupation was chronicled by leading newspapers, documentaries 
by domestic and foreign filmmakers, BBC reports, academic articles and theses, 
and a feature article in Rolling Stone Brasil.
The occupation would undergo a series of interruptions and revivals. But 
the most powerful break came in mid-2007. São Paulo’s mayor, Kassab, had just 
attended the April C40 summit in New York, where Mayor Bloomberg and others 
enthusiastically celebrated the densification of city cores as a critical element of 
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low-carbon urbanism. At the summit’s close, Kassab ordered Jorge to begin the 
process of drafting climate legislation. Weeks later, Kassab had the Prestes Maia 
occupiers evicted. The city did arrange housing for many of the occupiers—but 
mostly in the city’s most peripheral areas. The city refused the occupiers’ cen-
tral demand that the city obey prevailing laws and convert a mass of abandoned 
buildings into social housing.
Meanwhile, the coalition of housing movement activists, small shopkeepers, 
and the PT had Nova Luz’s expropriation efforts suspended in the courts. They 
also made it an electoral issue. PT mayor Fernando Haddad, elected with sup-
port from housing movements, took office in January 2013 and canceled Nova 
Luz for good.
São Paulo’s poor, working class, and small shopkeepers demonstrated the 
power of a multi-class alliance fighting for a right to the city. And through their 
projects in and around the Prestes Maia occupation, they prefigured an alterna-
tive, long-term model for a culturally vibrant and egalitarian urban core. But 
they were also alienated from explicit ecological politics by the Serra and Kassab 
mayoralties’ high-profile marriage of ecological discourses, gray and green, to 
luxury urban projects and developments that displaced the poor and ignored 
their immediate need for improved public transit.
This would serve as a substantial barrier to movement organizers interested 
in framing their struggles in ecological terms. Most housing movement organiz-
ers I spoke with lamented their groups’ lack of recent, explicit engagement on 
environmental issues, while pointing out that under Serra and Kassab, ecological 
rhetoric seemed mainly to serve as cover for gentrification and displacement. The 
irony is that what the poor people’s movements demanded would have shrunk the 
city’s carbon footprint by increasing low-income housing downtown for those 
who worked there, reducing traffic on the roads, and modeling more complete 
and livable communities accessible to all. Yet trumpeting all this would require 
the elaboration of a whole other political and discursive framework, one building 
on a technical grasp of urban carbon-emissions accounting that, understand-
ably, housing activists mired in everyday battles were in no hurry to acquire. But 
if movements of the poor do not (always) explicitly engage in climate politics, 
are they fated to play only an oppositional role to elite-backed projects? I argue 
below that such movements can not only block luxury gray ecologies, but also 
join coalitions in support of democratic gray ecologies.
Partial Victories
On May 23, 2013, two unrelated roundtables on climate politics were held in 
São Paulo. The first, at the University of São Paulo, addressed the release of a 
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greenhouse gas emissions audit, announcing that emissions had increased since 
2003, despite the 2009 climate law (Rodrigues 2013). The second, at City Hall, 
was held to launch a joint project of international aid, with funding from the 
European Union and the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), 
which had worked for years with the center-focused Apoio and a connected, 
periphery-oriented group (see www.programaurbano.com). The theme was 
securing precarious housing in the face of extreme weather caused by climate 
change. Apoio and its favela-based partner organization brought so many of 
their members, nearly one thousand poor people of color, that they filled the 
City Hall’s main auditorium, as well as an overflow auditorium with a video link 
(where I stood) and a courtyard outside with audio speakers.
The roundtable featured representatives of CAFOD and the European Union, 
leaders of several housing movements and organizations, and three leftist PT 
politicians. When Apoio’s director, Manoel del Rio, rose to speak, he mentioned 
adaptation to climate change in passing. He then delivered a thundering call for 
a poor people’s compact city. “You want a low-carbon city?” he shouted. “How 
about more social housing for the poor downtown? How about better public 
transit? How about urbanizing the favelas, and having economic development 
there?” The European Union and CAFOD representatives seemed unprepared 
for the meeting’s tone. They spoke politely about collaborations across borders. 
Other speakers, from the housing movement and the PT, delivered variations on 
del Rio’s themes: espousing the potential of poor people reclaiming from elites 
the environment as an issue and insisting that confrontational struggle remain a 
central strategy. Even in the overflow auditorium, audience members frequently 
broke into applause. Onstage, one PT politician led a housing movement chant: 
“Those who don’t struggle . . .” he cried out and paused. “Die!” The audience 
roared in response.
Months later, I met with del Rio, one of his colleagues, and CAFOD’s princi-
pal liaison for the project. How did this democratic ecology vision come about? 
On CAFOD’s end, there was increasing pressure from European Union funders 
to incorporate climate change into its overseas programming. More interesting 
is del Rio’s trajectory. In fact, he had been developing his own concept of the 
low-carbon, poor people’s compact city for years. This was based on his earlier 
history as a labor organizer, where he came to view the lengthening commutes 
of workers as a form of wage theft. From there, he shifted to housing organizing, 
focused on securing the right of workers to live near their jobs, as a way to more 
justly balance the working day and everyday life. Del Rio also saw this strategy as 
a means to combat the sprawl of peripheries into ecologically sensitive waterways 
at city’s edge. Thus, when the discussion of carbon and urbanism arrived in São 
Paulo, del Rio elaborated a distinct approach to the issue, a democratic gray ecol-
ogy vision rooted in a long-standing labor perspective on density.
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Meanwhile, within governmental policy circuits, green policy technocrats 
have also begun working with Mayor Haddad’s new PT administration on demo-
cratic gray ecology projects. On the transit question, the administration has reap-
pointed many of the architects of the 2000–2004 Suplicy administration’s bus 
service expansion. Pressed into action by the June 2013 wave of protests against 
rising bus fares, the administration recanted on the fare increase and accelerated 
the provision of dedicated bus lanes, building 327 kilometers by May 2014, more 
than double the amount Haddad promised in his campaign. The administra-
tion then produced hundreds of kilometers of bicycle lanes and promised to 
extend their network to every district of the city. The bus lanes, in particular, 
have proved popular in polls (Monteiro 2014). In addition to meeting the needs 
of low-income commuters, these actions should reduce the city’s localized green-
house gas emissions—a point Haddad rarely makes.
On housing, the issue is more complex. Haddad’s administration, far from 
tempering the roar of São Paulo’s real estate boom, is stoking its flames with wide-
spread measures to increase the urban quality of life, including the revitalization 
of parks and plazas. The administration, under pressure from housing move-
ments, announced in its first month the construction of twenty thousand homes, 
through a state-supported public-private partnership, in the central region where 
Nova Luz had been planned. In pursuit of this goal, large abandoned buildings 
have finally been expropriated—including the twenty-three-story building on 
Prestes Maia whose mid-2000s occupation captured the popular imagination. 
What remains unclear, even three years into Haddad’s first term (the time of 
writing), is whether the long-term agenda he has laid out will bear real fruit.
The administration’s broader vision is outlined in a master plan whose imple-
mentation will take years and whose passage depended on vigorous housing move-
ment support. The basic notion is to establish a more polycentric urban form, 
with denser, multiuse and multi-class corridors connecting more employment 
clusters. The key idea is to take existing rail infrastructure along postindustrial 
and degraded river corridors, turn these into mass transit byways, and encourage 
tall, dense, mixed-use buildings along their length. There are connected plans 
to shift housing toward the center and commerce and office work toward the 
periphery—aiming to move as much economic activity as possible into poorer 
areas where workers (including much of the middle class) presently live.
Housing movements have won commitments to affordable-housing con-
struction along the new, dense axes—pushing against the trend where improved 
mass transit access causes increases in property value that cause displacement. 
But it remains unclear how much of this will materialize. For the government 
to implement its affordability mandates will be difficult. It is still counting on 
private investments from companies that will seek to evade regulations. And the 
plan depends on heady, “global city”–style growth, despite the model’s persistent 
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association with land and labor market polarization. What is more, Brazil’s eco-
nomic growth has recently ground to a halt.
It is also sobering to note the administration’s decision not to trumpet the 
ecological virtues of its planning measures outside small and specialized audi-
ences of environmental activists. At one level, this seems a missed opportunity. 
If there is a possible overlap between middle-class environmental objectives and 
working-class demands for a more decent life, should these not be emphasized?
But this relative silence is not just the administration’s preference alone. Many 
green policy elites have encouraged the camouflage of low-carbon policy in 
social-justice garb. Adalberto Maluf, the C40’s representative in São Paulo, has 
worked closely with the new secretariat for urban development on a wide range of 
gray ecology interventions, including the expansion of dedicated bus lines for which 
Maluf has long advocated. Maluf insists that Brazil’s most pressing problem is social 
inequality, and urban political interventions need to be framed in such terms.
Conclusion
If every actor is an ecological actor, and if the planet’s ecological future hangs 
in part on cutting carbon emissions by making cities denser through changes to 
housing, transit, and land use, then it follows that housing, labor, and right-to-
the-city movements battling over these issues are decisive ecological actors. In 
São Paulo, as elsewhere, these movements exert a fair amount of power, even 
if they rarely realize their chief objectives. They exert this power in pursuit of 
collective consumption objectives, with the prospective carbon gains of reduced 
car traffic and more efficient buildings compounded by low levels of individual 
consumption, and by their advocacy for a city oriented more to public services 
than private consumption. These urban poor people’s movements are prospec-
tive low-carbon protagonists of serious heft.
This is more than just a politically correct exercise in deductive reasoning. Out 
on the streets, these movements play a vital role in determining the shape of the 
city. And some clever policy actors have taken note, seeking in favorable politi-
cal circumstances to blend low-carbon policy making with measures to increase 
social and economic justice.
This suggests that there is no basic opposition between green and social pri-
orities in urban politics. Although low-carbon urbanism has often gone hand 
in hand with the kinds of neoliberal urbanism discussed throughout this vol-
ume, alternative low-carbon urbanisms are possible—indeed, already emerging. 
A core concern for scholars supportive of right-to-the-city struggles must be to 
recognize and articulate the range of distinctive pathways to the low-carbon city, 
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including the array of potential coalitions. Increasingly, the key axis of urban 
ecological politics will not be the opposition between social and ecological, or 
economic and ecological, but between different class-structured versions of the 
green city project—between luxury ecologies and democratic ecologies. No 
one wants to live on a scalding planet; no doubt, few want to live in a world of 
eco-apartheid. This suggests that there is a strategic opportunity to link right-to-
the-city movements with green policy elites whose primary objectives are eco-
logical (rather than the perpetuation of professional-class privilege). What I term 
democratic gray ecologies could be a site for this alliance.
To be sure, there is no defined model of how to do this. Even in cities where 
center-leftists have pressed low-carbon policy, like London and Paris, gentrifica-
tion and displacement threaten the very social fabric of those cities. But recogniz-
ing the potential of a democratic gray ecology coalition, which could meet the 
looming pressures for carbon emissions reductions in a just, egalitarian way, does 
not depend on already-existing models of complete success.
Meanwhile, just as it is important to test these ideas in other cities, it is also 
imperative to experiment with them beyond urban cores. The great majority 
of human beings live outside global cities’ central areas. Planetary urbaniza-
tion is mostly crowding peripheries. In core areas, most elites now recognize the 
imperative of improving quality of life to enhance economic competitiveness. 
Social movements can demand that such redevelopments be equitable, claiming 
a piece of readily available investment funds. But in peripheries, neoliberal eco-
nomic rationality is more liable to entail brutal, dehumanizing efficiencies—the 
rampant overcrowding of apartment towers, buses, schools, hospitals, parks, and 
more. There too, movements of poor are effectively pursuing democratic, gray 
ecologies. But the suburban terrain is distinctive and in many cases more chal-
lenging (Cohen 2014; Charmes and Keil 2015; Keil 2013).
Nevertheless, housing movements in global cities’ cores are taking vital first 
steps, with crucial implications for a warming world. As the radical urbanist Mike 
Davis argues, “the corner-stone of the low-carbon city . . . is the priority given 
to public affluence over private wealth” (Davis 2010, 43). Global cities are rich 
in financial resources and symbolic capital. Money and journalists accumulate 
there. All their downtowns are a stage, and the world is watching. For movements 
of the poor to take up the low-carbon cause would require few changes to those 
movements’ objectives; it could, meanwhile, grow their alliances and broaden 
their messages’ appeal. For these movements to achieve even a modest democ-
ratization of global city cores, in the process reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
would be a major achievement. Then would come the next challenges—linking 
up with gray ecology struggles in expanding peripheries, building broader coali-
tions, and deepening the transformative project.
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